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weak conformity in equilibrium, with both rms serving the market.
In this paper the linear transportation cost hypothesis is adopted, but it is
combined with a quadratic formulation of the externality function. The choice
of exploring the behavior of the market within this set-up turns out to be
particularly useful in a double perspective. First, though both negative and
positive externalities are jointly allowed for, the régime prevailing at equilib-
rium can be identied through a simple (a priory) comparison between the
transportation cost size and the sign of the externality evaluated at the total
population size. Second, and more important, it turns out that in this frame-
work the location stage of the Hotelling game can be meaningfully solved even
in the presence of linear transportation costs. The principle of minimum dif-
ferentiation is conrmed, in a situation in which agglomeration coexists with
rms earning positive prots. In particular, we show that rms endogenously
choose to locate in the center of the interval, sharing the market with positive
prices. If both imitation and congestion e¤ects inuence consumersbehavior,
market power can be consistent with full market coverage, price competition
and homogeneous products. The intuition behind this result is that at equilib-
rium, the consumers of both rms enjoy a positive but decreasing externality.
At the margin congestion is perceived, and this allows rms to push up their
prices.
The discussion is organized as follows. In section 1, we deal with the main
characteristics of the consumption externality and study the strategic choices
of rms with respect to prices and locations. Some conclusions are gathered
in the last section.
1 The model
Consider the Hotelling (1929) model, where two stores 1 and 2 are respectively
located at x1R and x2R on the real line, with x1  x2. There is a continuum
of consumers of mass N uniformly distributed over the interval [0; 1]. A con-
sumer located at x [0; 1] bears a transportation cost of t jx  xij for buying
from the store located at xi (i = 1; 2), where t  0 is the transportation rate
per unit distance. Let Ni denote the number of consumers patronizing store i.
The consumer patronizing the store i is a¤ected by the following consumption
externality (Grilo et al., 2001):
Cexti (Ni) = Ni   N2i (1)
in which  > 0 expresses the incidence of the positive imitation (or conformity)
e¤ect, while  > 0 - which a¤ects the degree of concavity of the externality
function - is a measure of the incidence of the negative congestion (or vanity)
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e¤ect. The externality function is dened over the domain Ni [0;N ]. Notice
that if  be negative, the network e¤ects would be negative over the entire
domain, and each consumer would always su¤er a loss from an increase in the
number of consumers buying from the same store. If  > 0, the sign of the
overall externality may be negative or positive. Therefore we have two oppo-
site forces at work: a positive imitation and a negative congestion e¤ect. We
assume that when evaluated at the total population size, the sign of the above
externality is negative, i.e. Cexti (N) < 0. This allows to identify three possible
regions. For Ni 2
i
0; 
2
h
no congestion arises. In this range the externality is
positive and increasing in the clientele size: only the imitation e¤ect is observed
and its (positive) maximum value is achieved for Ni = 2 . As the number of
consumers patronizing store i further increases, the (positive) imitation e¤ect
is partially o¤set by a crowding e¤ect. Therefore, for Ni 2
i

2
; 

h
the ex-
ternality is still positive, but its value decreases as the number of consumers
patronizing the same store increases. Finally, for Ni
i


;N
h
the externality be-
comes negative and decreasing in the number of consumers: this means that
the negative congestion e¤ect dominates the positive imitation e¤ect 1 . Notice
that by imposing Cexti (N) < 0 we allow for the possibility that the negative
congestion e¤ect dominate the positive network e¤ect, at least for a large size
of the rms clientele (gure 1).
As in the standard spatial model we assume that each consumer purchases one
unit of the product. When buying from store i, the indirect utility of consumer
located at x is then dened by:
Vi(x) = K   pi + Cexti (N ei )  t j x  xi j i = 1; 2 (2)
where K denotes the gross intrinsic utility the consumer derives from consum-
ing one unit of the product and N ei is the consumersexpectation about the
e¤ective number of customers served by store i.
It is well known that the price and location choice of the two rms can be
seen as a two-stage game, the solution of which is a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. In the rst stage the rms set their locations, in
the second stage they choose their prices. We solve for the market equilibrium
through backward induction.
We are interested in nding a consumer located at x^ [0; 1] so that all con-
sumers indexed by x [0; x^[ patronize rm 1 and all consumers indexed by
x ]x^; 1] patronize rm 2. For x^ to be the location of the consumer indi¤erent
to buy from rm 1 or rm 2, it must satisfy:
V1(x^) = V2(x^)
1 Notice that for Ni =  the two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other.
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that is:
 p1 + N e1    (N e1 )2   t j x^  x1 j=  p2 + N e2    (N e2 )2   t j x^  x2 j (3)
If market is fully covered, then N1 +N2 = N . Moreover, the following condi-
tions must be satised:
N1 = N
e
1 = Nx^ and N2 = N
e
2 = N(1  x^) (4)
These conditions mean that, in equilibrium, consumersexpectations about
the network size are fullled. Making use of (3) and (4) and solving for x^, we
have:
x^ =
(p2   p1) + t (x1 + x2)  Cext(N)
2 [t  Cext(N)] (5)
Notice that, given our hypotheses about the sign of the externality evaluated
at N , the denominator of (5) is always positive: [t  Cext(N)] > 0 8; ; t.
Before solving for equilibrium, we characterize the price pairs such that both
rms have a positive market share. To do that, we nd the su¢ cient and
necessary conditions for x^ [0; 1]:
x^  0 if (p1   p2)  t (x1 + x2)  Cext(N) (6)
and
x^  1 if (p1   p2)   t (2  x1   x2) + Cext(N) (6)
When inequalities (6) and (6) simultaneously hold, both rms 1 and 2 have
a positive demand, corresponding respectively to N1 and N2 in (4).
Moreover, we dene the characterization of the price pairs for which only a
single rm serves the market. Consider rst the case in which N1 = N and
N2 = 0, i.e. the price pairs in which V1(x^) > V2(x^) for all x^ [0; 1]. This
situation arises if and only if:
(p1   p2) <  t (2  x1   x2) + Cext(N) (7)
Consider next the opposite case, N1 = 0 and N2 = N with V1(x^) < V2(x^) for
all x^ [0; 1]. This market conguration arises when:
(p1   p2) > t (x1 + x2)  Cext(N) (8)
Inequalities (6-6), (7) and (8) are mutually exclusive. Consider rst the do-
main dened by (6) and (6), where the demand functions of the two rms,
linear and decreasing in the own price, are given by:
N1(p1; p2) = Nx^ = N
(p2   p1) + t (x1 + x2)  Cext(N)
2 [t  Cext(N)] (9)
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for rm 1, and
N2(p1; p2) = N(1  x^) = N (p1   p2) + t (2  x1   x2)  C
ext(N)
2 [t  Cext(N)] (10)
for rm 2. Assuming that production takes place at zero costs, the prot
functions of the two rms are dened respectively by:
1 = p1N1(p1; p2) = Np1
(p2   p1) + t (x1 + x2)  Cext(N)
2 [t  Cext(N)] (11)
2 = p2N2(p1; p2) = Np2
(p1   p2) + t (2  x1   x2)  Cext(N)
2 [t  Cext(N)] (12)
Firm 1 takes p2 as given and chooses p1 to maximize 1; while rm 2 takes p1
as given and chooses p2 to maximize 2. Given the location of the two stores,
by di¤erentiating i with respect to pi, we obtain the following best-response
functions:
@1
@p1
= 0() p1 = 1
2
h
p2 + t (x1 + x2)  Cext(N)
i
(13)
@2
@p2
= 0() p2 = 1
2
h
p1 + t (2  x1   x2)  Cext(N)
i
(14)
Since the prot functions (11) and (12) are concave, (13) and (14) are the
necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a maximum. Solving for (13) and (14)
we obtain:
p1(x1; x2) =
t
3
(2 + x1 + x2)  Cext(N) (15)
p2(x1; x2) =
t
3
(4  x1   x2)  Cext(N) (16)
For (15) and (16) to be the equilibrium prices, it remains to check whether
they satisfy the inequalities in (6) and (6), that is:
 t (2  x1   x2) + Cext(N)   2
3
t (1  x1   x2)  t (x1 + x2)  Cext(N)
It easily checked that these conditions are satised for any location such that:
 2  x1 + x2  4 (17)
Therefore, as far as the two stores locate inside the interval, (6) and (6)
always hold. Notice that the above range of locations pairs for which the
equilibrium prices exist is the same as that identied by Grilo et al. (2001)
in a framework where transportation costs are quadratic. Moreover, we could
extend to this set-up their interpretation of the model in terms of vertical
di¤erentiation: in case rms locate outside the interval [0; 1] and produce two
vertically di¤erentiated products (gure 2), they could both survive because of
the emergence of some congestion e¤ect in consumption, in absence of which
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only the rm with the best quality good could enjoy a positive demand. In
synthesis, market sharing occurs provided that (17) holds; it entails either the
horizontal product di¤erentiation if 0  x1 + x2  2 or the vertical product
di¤erentiation if x1 + x2  0 (or x1 + x2  2).
It is well know that in the Hotelling model with linear transportation costs
a price equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist when stores are symmet-
ric located in the inner quartiles. Di¤erently, our example shows that posi-
tive equilibrium prices exist for any symmetric and asymmetric location when
consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and congestion e¤ects. Moreover,
even if the stores were located at the same point, the usual Bertrand argument
should not lead to the competitive outcome.
As a proof, payo¤s of the two rms, valued at the equilibrium prices (15)
and (16), are globally optimal if they are at least as great as the payo¤s that
rms would earn by undercutting the rivals price and suppling the whole
market. Store 1 may gain the whole market undercutting its rival by setting
pM1 = [p

2   t (2  x1   x2) + Cext(N)  ], in this case prot amount to M1 =
2
3
Nt [x1 + x2   1] for a small . The similar argument is valid for the store 2,
undercutting the rival it would earns M2 =
2
3
Nt [1  x1   x2]. The conditions
for such undercutting not to be protable are:
1  M1 ()
h
t (2 + x1 + x2)  3Cext(N)
i2  12t [x1 + x2   1] ht  Cext(N)i
2  M2 ()
h
t (4  x1   x2)  3Cext(N)
i2  12t [1  x1   x2] ht  Cext(N)i
that are: h
t (4  x1   x2)  3Cext(N)
i2  0h
t (2 + x1 + x2)  3Cext(N)
i2  0
Therefore provided that (17) holds, a unique price equilibrium exists.
Proposition 1: When consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and con-
gestion e¤ects, for any symmetric and asymmetric locations for which (17)
hold, there exists a unique price equilibrium and it is described by (15) and
(16).
Substituting the equilibrium prices into (9) and (10) yields the number of
consumers served by the two rms as function of their locations:
N1(p

1; p

2) = N
t (2 + x1 + x2)  3Cext(N)
6 [t  Cext(N)] (18)
N2(p

1; p

2) = N
t (4  x1   x2)  3Cext(N)
6 [t  Cext(N)] (19)
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Therefore at the equilibrium prices, prots are given by:
1(x1; x2) = N
[t (2 + x1 + x2)  3Cext(N)]2
18 [t  Cext(N)] (20)
2(x1; x2) = N
[t (4  x1   x2)  3Cext(N)]2
18 [t  Cext(N)] (21)
We now investigate how externality function a¤ects equilibrium. For any given
location of the two stores, both prices and prots result decreasing with respect
to  and increasing with respect to  and N . When consumer preferences
are appreciably a¤ected from positive network e¤ects (high ), as expected
competition is ercer and it results in lower equilibrium prices (and prots). By
contrast, when consumer preferences su¤er from strong congestion e¤ects (high
), the relaxing in competition allows rms to set higher prices (and prots).
Also notice that for given  and , an increase in consumer population (N)
gives back an higher predictability to nd overcrowd stores, hence it pushes
up the equilibrium prices (and prots).
Proposition 2: When consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and con-
gestion e¤ect, the equilibrium prices increase as:
1) the consumer population raises (higher N),
2) the imitation e¤ect becomes less signicant (lower ),
3) the congestion e¤ect becomes more signicant (higher ).
Also we investigate how the network e¤ects a¤ects the storesmarket shares.
Through (5), the derivative of x^(p1; p

2) with respect to  yields:
@x^
@
= N
t(x1 + x2   1)
6 [t  Cext(N)]2
Thus under asymmetric locations, an increase in  increases the clientele size
of the store with positional advantage and decreases the clientele size of its
rival. Di¤erently, di¤erentiating x^ with respect to , we obtain opposite results:
@x^
@
= N2
t(1  x1   x2)
6 [t  Cext(N)]2
an increase in  reduces the clientele size of the store with positional advantage
and increases that one of its rival. Lastly, we investigate how the size of the
total population inuences the market shares of the two stores. Di¤erentiating
x^ with respect to N yields:
@x^
@N
= N
t(1  x1   x2)(2N   )
6 [t  Cext(N)]2
therefore since our assumption aboutN > 

holds, an increase in the consumer
population reduces the market share of the large store and increases the market
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share of the small one. Notice that when the stores are symmetrically located,
the indi¤erent consumer between the two rms is always in the center of
the interval [0; 1] therefore the size of the total population, N , and the two
parameters,  and , do not a¤ect the market shares even if they still a¤ect
the equilibrium prices. Moreover, the derivatives of (18) and (19) with respect
to N yields:
@N1
@N
=
t (2 + x1 + x2)  3Cext(N)
6 [t  Cext(N)] +N
t(1  x1   x2)(2N   )
6 [t  Cext(N)]2
@N2
@N
=
t (4  x1   x2)  3Cext(N)
6 [t  Cext(N)] +N
t(x1 + x2   1)(2N   )
6 [t  Cext(N)]2
and since (17) holds, both the rst terms in the above derivatives are positive.
Thus, while an increase in the size of the total population increases both
market share and clientele size of the small store, the e¤ect on the clientele
size of the large store depends on parameters.
Proposition 3: When consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and con-
gestion e¤ect, the market share of the store with positional advantage (gure
3) increases as:
1) the imitation e¤ect becomes more signicant (higher ),
2) the congestion e¤ect becomes less signicant (lower ),
3) the population falls (lower N) even if the clientele size should be reduced.
Proposition 4: When consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and con-
gestion e¤ect, the market share of the store with positional disadvantage in-
creases as:
1) the imitation e¤ect becomes less signicant (lower ),
2) the congestion e¤ect becomes more signicant (higher ),
3) the population raises (higher N).
At the rst stage of the game, given the equilibrium prices, both store 1 and
store 2 set their locations in order to maximize respectively (20) and (21).
The derivatives of (20) and (21) with respect respectively to x1and x2, yield:
@1(x1; x2)
@x1
=N
t [t (2 + x1 + x2)  3Cext(N)]
9 [t  Cext(N)] > 0 (22)
@2(x1; x2)
@x2
= N t [t (4  x1   x2)  3C
ext(N)]
9 [t  Cext(N)] < 0
Since (17) holds, the rms earn higher prots by moving towards the center.
Then, endogenously the two stores locate at the center of the interval [0; 1]. In
this case rms share the market selling a homogeneous product at the same
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positive price. Therefore, the Principle of Minimum Product Di¤erentiation
holds even for linear transportation costs.
Proposition 5: When consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and con-
gestion e¤ects, even if consumers face linear transportation costs, there exists
a unique symmetric equilibrium in which rms locate in the center of the in-
terval setting positive prices:
1) p1 = p2 = [t  Cext(N)],
2) x1 = x2 = 12 .
2 Conclusion
We have investigated price competition in the Hotelling location model with
linear transportation costs when consumer preferences are a¤ected by the num-
ber of consumers shopping at the same store. The introduction of a quadratic
and concave consumption externality permits to consider at the same time,
and not alternatively, both the imitation and the congestion e¤ects which are
opposite forces at work.
Some signicant even if predictable results are been reached. While compe-
tition is relaxed when consumers have an appreciable degree of sensitivity to
congestion e¤ects, a ercer price competition results when preferences are ap-
preciably a¤ected from imitative behaviors. The sensibility of consumer pref-
erences to the two opposite network e¤ects also have signicant impacts on
the market share of the stores in cases of positional advantages. The market
share of the store with positional advantage increases either when the imita-
tion e¤ect becomes more signicant and when the congestion e¤ect becomes
less important. Even if our approach is partial -perhaps not too general- in
many aspects, it resolves the non-existence problem of the Hotelling model.
Our model shows that positive equilibrium prices exist for any symmetric and
asymmetric location. Moreover, even if the stores were located at the same
point, the usual Bertrand argument should not lead to the competitive out-
come. Furthermore given the possibility for rms to set the best locations, we
confer new validity to the principle of minimum product di¤erentiation when
consumer preferences exhibit both imitation and congestion e¤ects.
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